Introduction 44
Between-farm animal movement has historically been associated with disease spread Pelaez et al., 2006; R. P. Smith et al., 2013) . Animal movement data has allowed for the initial 46 development of network-based approaches, which are dominated by the use of static network 47 metrics to identify vulnerable farms. In a contact network, each farm (node) can play a role in the 48 dynamics of disease spread, and some can be classified as vulnerable because they periodically 49 receive infected animals (a high "in" degree); therefore, the identification of these farms is more 50 important in scenarios of the absence or low prevalence of disease (Qi et al., 2019) . Such 51 locations may serve as sentinels. On the other hand, farms that are more likely to spread disease 52 throughout their contact network could be targeted, by which restricting or monitoring outgoing 53 movements could effectively reduce disease spread (Cárdenas et al., 2018; Payen et al., 2019) . 54
Ultimately, the use of network-based metrics to select farms for isolation or surveillance schemes 55 has shown great value ( Therefore, it is recognized that the current neglected temporality of real-world animal 76 movements has been a constant roadblock to the advancement of network epidemiology, 77 especially in the development of methodologies (Pellis et al., 2015) . 78
Stochastic simulations have been used extensively to measure the impact of disease control 79 strategies in future disease spread scenarios (Smith et al., 2017; Funk et al., 2018; Kim et al., 80 2019; Lanzas et al., 2020) . Mathematical models have also been used to experimentally spread 81 disease over contact networks and reveal important dynamic characteristics of epidemics (Miller, 82 2017; P. Kim and Lee, 2018; Darbon et al., 2019) . For example, compartmental models can be 83 used to describe the epidemic spreading in temporal contact networks, which provides an 84 opportunity for tracing outbreaks and contact among nodes over time (C. Guinat et al., 2016; 85 Colman et al., 2019; Ferdousi et al., 2019; Sterchi et al., 2019) . Here, we used two years of pig 86 movement data from one Brazilian state to estimate the optimal number of farms for target 87 surveillance by tracking between-farm contact pathways and inferring epidemic sizes throughout 88 disease propagation. We first described the complete pig movements and then challenged the use 89 of static networks against dynamic networks. We proposed a stochastic compartmental model to 90 simulate disease spread in a two-year empirical network while accounting for the temporal order 91 of the movements. Our model formulation allowed the calculation of the minimum number of 92 farms needed to reduce disease spread and approximate the impact of network-based disease 93 control strategies (e.g., farm isolation, movement restriction, enhanced biosecurity) on the 94 expected epidemic sizes. Finally, we applied the proposed model to the time-varying pig 95 network, ultimately to provide a practical background for the identification of targeted farms, 96 which were then mapped and described in regard to their biosecurity and infrastructure. 97 98
Material and methods 99

Data collection and entry 100
The record of pig shipments among all registered farms of one Brazilian state was used to 101 reconstruct contact networks from 2017 until 2018 (SEAPI-RS, 2018). Information about each 102 swine farm included farm identification, production types (breeding, certified-swine-breeder, 103 sow, nursery, wean-to-finisher, finisher, subsistence and others), farms infrastructure (e.g., 104
presence of a fence, presence of a cleaning and disinfection station, see table 2 for the full list), 105 geolocation and farms population capacity. Each pig shipment included date(s), farm of origin 106 and destination, number of animals transported and purpose of movement (weaning, finishing, slaughter or other). Movement data with missing information of farm location, production type, 108 farm of origin or destination were excluded prior to the analysis. Additionally, farms declared 109 inactive (no pigs raised in the past two years or out of business) were not considered in the 110 analysis. Movements from or to other states were also excluded from any analysis. Based in 111 information reported to the local authorities in June 2018 all farms were classified as i) 112 "commercial" farm with active contracts with integrated swine companies, ii) "independent" 113 farm that declared to be commercial but did not have active contract with integrated swine 114 companies and small farm holders that, and iii) "not reported" farms that failed to report to local 115 authorities their pig operation type. The identification of 1,911 (21.4%) not reported farms, 116 resulted in regional policy in which the state authorities issued a request to all farms report pig 117 operation status, within one year, farms that fail to report will have all pig movements blocked 118 until information is shared. Finally, from the total number of active pig farms 11,849, a subset of 119 farms 9,500 had registered geographic coordinates which included commercial, independent and 120 not reported business type, therefore were used for the simulation modeling subsections. 121 122
Static and monthly networks reconstruction and analysis 123
Two directed networks were reconstructed. First, a static network with directed "edges" 124 represented by pig shipments between two "nodes", where nodes corresponded to pig farms. The 125 accessible by all "nodes" in a network, which can lead to an overestimation of the connectivity 140 among the nodes (Holme and Saramäki, 2012; Lentz et al., 2016) . To quantify the amounts of 141 such static error, the number of paths in the static view can be compared with the number of 142 paths in the time-series network . This ratio is known as the causal 143 fidelity "c", where: 144
(1)
145
The number of paths is the number of nonzero elements in p or P. A causal fidelity of one means 146 that the temporal network is well represented by its static network, while networks with lower 147 causal fidelity values would not represent the temporal paths well because most of the paths are 148 not causal. Here, we calculated the causal fidelity on timescales that are typically used to 149 investigate animal movement data: monthly, 6 months and 1 year and for the full two years of 150 data that were used to reconstruct directed networks . We also calculated the 151 edge loyalty ( ), which measures the fraction of preserved edges ( ) of a given premise between 152 two consecutive years, − 1 and . To quantify −1, , we define −1 as the set of edges from 153 the premise in the time − 1 and as the set of edges from the premise at time . Then, 154 −1, is given by the Jaccard Index in equation 2 (Valdano et al., 2015; Schulz et al., 2017) . 155
For the node loyalty, we use the same Jaccard Index, 156
where −1 is the set of farms that are active in period − 1, and is the set of farms that moved 157 at least one animal at time (Valdano et al., 2015; Schulz et al., 2017) . 158
159
The minimum number of farms needed for effective control disease spreading process over 160
time-varying network 161
We developed a stochastic susceptible-infectious (SI) epidemic model to calculate the minimum 162 number of farms needed to effectively reduce the number of new cases expected to spread 163 through the contact network. The number of infections after the removal of farms raked by 164 network metrics betweenness, closeness, page rank and degree, random removals (similar to the 165 current state of farm surveillance), and without farm removal were the main model outputs. The completely stochastic simulation can be summarized as follows: the empirical movement 172 data from 2017 until 2018 was used to simulate disease spread over a time-varying network; 173 here, we assume an initial herd prevalence of 10% and 0.1% of infected pigs in each farm, in 174 which disease was allowed to be transmitted between and within farms. For the within-farm 175 transmission rate, we use a set of values of 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2, which can also be 176 considered the product of the contact rates and the transmission probability between animals into 177 the farms. Another assumption was that the contact rates among pigs were homogenous. For the 178 between-farm transmission, we considered the observed number of pigs that moved between 179 farms and the population size at each farm. As an initial condition, model simulation started with 180 950 infected farms (10% prevalence) at time "0". Here, we proposed two realistic strategies to 181 seed initial infected nodes. First, pig farms were selected at random from all farms with at least 182 one movement from 2017 to 2018. For the second strategy, infected farms were chosen 183
proportionally to the number of farms in commercial, independent, and not reported. This 184 allowed the initial infection to be seeded within all types of pig operations. The comparison of 185 both disease introduction approaches allowed us to test a more realistic scenario since disease 186 can emerge at any location of the study area and in any pig operation (see Figure 1 ). The 187 simulated control intervention was based only on the sequential removal of farms from the time 188 "0" based on the static network metrics described above. While farms were removed, the number 189 of new cases per 100 susceptible farms was calculated. We chose an arbitrary number of 2,000 190 herds to be removed, and at the end of each simulation scenario the incidence of new cases was 191 Infection was seeded into all candidate farms randomly 100 times, from which simulations were 196 run and the median incidence was derived for each run. For a sensitivity analysis, we ran 197 simulations with a diverse set of parameters (see supplementary figure S3 ). Thereafter, we will refer to this model as "spread cascade", which is a temporal representation of 206 the cumulative and consecutive contacts among farms, and therefore can be interpreted as the 207 size of an epidemic (Payen et al., 2019) . The hypothetical disease spread followed the 208 chronological order of movements over the two years. In short, when there was a directed 209 interaction, including the three dimensions of time t, infected farm i and susceptible farms j, 210 disease has successfully been transmitted. These events were counted in favor of each farm i 211 cascade and the triplet t, i, j and added to the temporal links of the stream; see (Payen et al., 212 2019) for more details of the methodology. Overall, we recorded the daily spread cascades for 213 the two years of data, which are represented by weekly averages and ± 95% CI (see 214 supplementary figure S4), and the accumulated spread cascades sizes for each seed node (9,500 215 farms in descending order of degree, betweenness, PageRank, and closeness and then removed 218 the top 10, 250, 500, 750 and 1,000 farms before starting the model simulation while recording 219 the spread cascade sizes. For comparison with usual surveillance practices, we selected the same 220 number of farms randomly. The contribution on containing the epidemic spread by each 221 network-based target surveillance strategy was evaluated by comparison of the final spread 222 cascade distributions at December 2018 using a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test followed by 223
Dunn's post hoc test, where the p-values below 5% were significant. Once the most efficient 224 network-based surveillance strategy was defined, the biosecurity, infrastructure and population 225 of the selected farms were described. 
Description of pig movements 237
The total number of active pig farms in the complete database included 11,849 farms, 351,519 238 movements and more than 48 million pigs transported. The majority, 40.4%, were identified as 239 commercial farms, 38.2% of independent pig producers, and 21.4% failed to report pig operation type (see preliminary table S1 to the description of the population in both pig operation classes). 241
In the commercial farms there were 17 pig production systems with the number of participant 242 farms varying from 10 to 465. While we have described movements into the 102 registered 243 slaughterhouses, they were not accounted for in any network analysis thereafter (see Figure 2 ). 244
Shipments from commercial to slaughterhouse totaled about 34% of the total movements, while 245 18% of the movements were from independent farms into slaughterhouses and 14% were 246 between commercial farms. Importantly movements from independent pig producers and from 247 farms that did not report type pig operation types into commercial farms were, 3.35% and 1.97%, 248 respectively. This interaction between non-commercial and commercial farms raises concerns 249 about the introduction and spread of known and unknown diseases circulation into highly 250 connected commercial farms (see supplementary table S1). Among all farms with information 251 about production types 6,555 (55.32%) finisher farms, 1,816 (15.33%) nurseries, 470 (3.97%) 252 wean-to-finisher farms, 433 (3.65%) breeding farms, 122 (1.03%) certified swine breeder farm 253 and 250 (2.11%) other farms, which included insemination stations and isolation units, 2,101 254 (17.73%) as small pig holders (backyard farms or for subsistence). More than 51% of movements were from finisher farms to slaughterhouses, with a monthly 258 median of 7,657 shipments. The second largest number of movements from nurseries to finisher 259 farms was 13.51%, with a monthly median of 1,992 transfers. Breeding farms made up for 260 4.65% of the movements to finisher farms and 4.3% of movements to the nurseries, with 673 261 monthly median movements. Finally, wean-to-finisher farms sent a small but significant amount 262 of pigs to slaughter (3.5%), while certified swine breeder farms accounted for 2.8% of 263 movements to slaughter (see The stochastic runs showed that the removal of 2,000 farms did not completely control the 300 disease from spreading, but it was reduced markedly to a maximum of 1.95 new cases per 100 301 farms when of 0.2 was used (the worst-case scenario). Since this study was designed to guide 302 decisions in the field, we consulted with the local stakeholders before deciding on the final 303 number of farms to be on the surveillance hot-list (personal communications with Dr. Lopes, 304
Chair of the Animal Movement and Surveillance Department of the state of Rio Grande do Sul). 305
Based on local capacities and the average number of new cases was reduced to as low as 7.88 306 cases per 100 farms with a of 0.2 when 1,000 farms were removed from the network, the 307 former was set to be the maximum number of feasible farms to be targeted. Furthermore, we 308 compared two infectious seed scenarios: a) infections started at random farms and b) stratified 309 random infections forced to start in proportion to the number of commercial, independent, and 310 not reported. Both have very similar results which reinforced the importance of independent 311 farms in the role of spreading diseases into commercial pig farms and vice versa (Figure 4 Most of the farms within the 1,000 target farms were commercial (55.6%), see Figure 6 , with one 327 production system contribution with 138 farms, and 29.7% were independent and 14.7% did not 328 report business operation From the comprehensive list of biosecurity and infrastructure 329 characteristics of the commercial farms, farms had a median of 2 barns (IQR-1-11), capacities 330 for housing were approximately 1,100 pigs (IQR=162-9,925), the median number of piglets was 331 1,122 (IQR-16-7,229), breeding farms had 4 (IQR=1-18) boars, and the gilts population was 544 332 (IQR-11-3,044). More details about the farms' biosecurity and infrastructures can be found in 333 Table 2 . 334 The majority of the movements were from commercial and independent pig farms to 339
slaughterhouses, but we also demonstrated the presence of a contact network between 340 independent and farms that did not report pig operation types with commercial enterprises. The 341 later finding is of concern and a key issue in the face of the introduction and spread of foreign 342 animal diseases (FADs) into highly connected commercial pig systems. We also demonstrated 343 that the use of static networks to identify tightly connected farms to be selected for surveillance 344 activities and to estimate disease spread dynamics would likely mislead disease control efforts 345 and overestimated epidemic sizes. Thus, our model formulation accounted for the temporal order 346 of the between-farm movements without overestimating the epidemic sizes while accounting for 347 impact on disease spread as network-based interventions were implemented, our model also 348 predicted the impact of network-based target disease control strategies (e.g., farm isolation, 349 movement restriction, enhancement of biosecurity) on the accumulated number of cases over the 350 next two years (2017 and 2018). These clearly demonstrate the advantages of temporal networks 351 to identify key farms to compose disease control contingency plans at national, local and at 352 production system level for vertical integrated animal production (i.e., swine, poultry), in order 353 to quickly mitigate an introduction and subsequent spread of infectious diseases. The generation 354 of a hot-list with farms to undergo complete lockdown or to which additional biosecurity can be 355 rapidly applied in the face of foreign animal disease and other biological threats to national 356 agriculture and food supply is a critical contribution of this study. 357
358
The frequency of shipments from independent to commercial pig farms reveal the importance of 359 analyzing the interaction between pig populations of diverse biosecurity levels. 360
These interactions pose significant risk for the introduction and spread of infectious diseases into 361 highly connected integrated commercial pig farms. Many studies showed that ASF spread in 362
China and parts of the EU have been related to pig movements between non-commercial and 2019). Indeed, there is a need to capture movements between non-commercial and commercial 371 pig farms and vice-versa, which also implies including those into the subsequent network and 372 modeling analysis. One important limitation of this study is the fact that 21.4 % of the farms did 373 provided information of the type of pig operation. Briefly, we evaluated the population in this 374 category, the median number of pig was 415 (IQR 1-1441) with median number of breeding 375 female of 72 (IQR 1-483), and median of 1 boar (IQR 0-4), see supplementary table S3 for more 376 details. By the number of total pigs and breeding females these farms are likely smaller operation 377 which may include farms with limited biosecurity. We highlight the need for a follow-up study 378 to collect more information about these farms, including the type of pig operation, farm's 379 infrastructure and information about biosecurity. Indeed, gathering and analyzing non-380 commercial and commercial interactions becomes more important as the pig industry around the 381 world prepares for the introduction of ASF, which will require tracking animal movements 382 among all pig farms ( shown diversity especially in the volume of movements (Miele et al., 2019) . Some factors that 412 have contributed to the variations in our study may be associated with hog prices, which tends to 413 be more volatile than in other countries. In addition, the monthly network diameter almost 414 doubled in the middle of 2018, which seems to be a highly abnormal pattern in the network. A 415 possible explanation for this may be related to the global configuration of the network because 416 the nodes were connected in a way that increased the length of the shortest paths between them, 417 which was accompanied by an increase in the GWCC. Consequently, during this period, we 418 observed an increase in the number of nodes and connections; therefore, a given node would 419 require more steps to reach another farm, within the network which could alone reduce the speed 420 of disease transmission (Vidondo and Voelkl, 2018) . While the GWCC increased over the years, 421 the GSCC suffered from relevant variations throughout the months, especially in the second half 422 of 2018, where new paths connected the GSCC with other minor components and consequently 423 increased the size of the GWCC, which could have implications for disease transmission and 424 persistence (Schulz et al., 2017; Marquetoux et al., 2016) . The sizes of GSCC and GWCC 425 variation were mostly attributed to variation in the number of commercial farms activities. Farms 426 that did not report operation types represented the minority of the farms in both components, 427 especially in April 2018 (see figure S1 ). 428
429
Our results show that different network-based intervention schemes successfully reduced the 430 spread of disease independently from the local transmission probability rates at the farm. We 431 show that targeting farms by degree was the most effective intervention in reducing the number 432 of new cases, followed by targeting farms by betweenness, which required ~ 1,300 farms to be 433 quarantined. Finally, as anticipated, random removal had little impact in controlling disease. A 434 recent study explored the contribution of existing trade duration on disease transmission 435 probabilities and the impact on epidemic sizes, suggesting that epidemic sizes were sensitive to 436 network activity (Farine and Whitehead, 2015; Lebl et al., 2016) . Indeed, we explicitly 437 considered node activity while disease spread was simulated. Two other studies attempted to 438 account for time-dependent disease spread while aiming to reduce 0 . One study used a non-439 compartmental model approach and found that the number of farms that needed to be removed 440 by degree approached 50% of all farms (Kinsley et al., 2019) . The second study used a 441 mechanistic approach in which ASF spread was simulated and found that degree ranking was the 442 best strategy to contain the disease (Ferdousi et al., 2019) . In summary, degree was shown to be 443 the best strategy in reducing disease burden, while betweenness had the second best 444 performance. It is worth noting that betweenness is a useful metric when studying disease 445 diffusion (Farine and Whitehead, 2015) , mainly because it is a representation of the shortest path 446 between nodes. Here independent farms with high betweenness may bridge several commercial 447 firms; therefore, more details about these unexplored pathways should be investigated in the 448 future. 449 450 Based on the identified minimum number of farms of 1,000 that needed to be removed from the 451 contact network, we simulated outbreak propagation with a deterministic SI model and identified 452 the most efficient network-based metric capable of reducing the expected size of spread 453 cascades. We showed that degree was the most significant intervention, with no more than 29 pig 454 farms involved per outbreak ( Figure 6 ). In addition, our results demonstrated that targeting more 455 than 500 farms by degree was efficient in reducing epidemic sizes. Random surveillance was 456 unexpectedly better than clossenes and PageRank for most of the two years of propagation. One 457 possible explanation may be that this network is not well connected, and farms that remain to be 458 removed may be too similar with respect to their clossennes and PageRank values; therefore, the 459 impact on the propagation is expected to be the one resulting from random removals. 460
461
Our results have shown an uneven proportion of commercial and independent pig farms within 462 the first 1,000 farms with the highest degree. This illustrates the interplay between the two 463 populations, where infection can arrive at either and propagate in both directions. Here, most 464 farms of interest lacked important biosecurity features, such as cleaning and disinfection stations 465 (Dee et al., 2006) . A study in Argentina also highlighted the lack of biosecurity on highly 466 connected farms (Alarcón et al., 2019) . On the other hand, in our study, most farms did not 467 utilize rendering, but preferred to compost dead animals. The former was previously described as 468 an important risk factor for the spread of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) 469 in the US (Velasova et al., 2012; Silva et al., 2019 ). In the same study, composting was found to 470 be the less risky practice when removing cull or dead pigs (Silva et al., 2019) . Another relevant 471 biosecurity point that has been described as a risk for disease introduction is the number of farm 472 entries; here, we noticed that the majority of the farms had only one main road, which potentially 473 represents less risk for local disease transmission (Silva et al., 2019) . A disproportionate number 474 of these highly risky farms were nurseries and breeding farms, which has often been proposed as 475 a desired group to be targeted for surveillance (Dorjee et al., 2013) . In addition to the 476 identification of priority farms, the identification of relevant biosecurity gaps at those farms is 477 invaluable, especially under the current preparedness for the introduction of foreign animal 478 diseases such as ASF. One of the best options is the implementation of enhanced biosecurity 479 plans, such the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan, designed to provide business continuity in the 480 event of a foreign animal disease outbreak as well as help protect operations from endemic 481 diseases (Pudenz et al., 2019) . 482
483
Finally, more comprehensive studies coupling animal movements with local and environmental 484 routes of transmission while accounting for farms biosecurity and infrastructure are needed to 485 further explore the mechanisms of pig disease propagation, for which a complete multiscale 486 mechanistic model is necessary (Qi et al., 2019) . 487
488
Considerations 489
The use of static networks to target key farms to control the disease from spreading should be 490 interpreted with caution due to several limitations associated with animal movement aggregation, 491 as shown in this study and elsewhere ). An obvious issue here is to assume that 492 the same pair of farms would trade with each other throughout the entire study periods.
Therefore, we argue that the causal fidelity of the temporal network should be presented before 494 considering the use of the static networks in the development of disease surveillance or control 495 strategies Payen et al., 2019) . Most of recent studies did not account for this 496 issue (Büttner et al., 2013 (Büttner et al., , 2018 In this study, we did not examine feed-truck or other vehicle movements or sharing. Such 500 information is absent from the majority of the current literature , but it has 501 been included in some studies (Augusta et al., 2019; Sterchi et al., 2019) . It is critical to 502 acknowledge that the movement of feed trucks and short-distance transportation of breeding 503 replacement animals or culled sows contributed to disease transmission (Silva et al., 2019) . 504
Indeed, before these additional contacts are not taken into consideration, our understanding of 505 disease spread pathways will likely continue to be limited. 506 507 Finally, the modeling framework proposed here can be broadly used to calculate the minimum 508 number of farms to be targeted for the control of disease spread when temporal contact data are 509 available and to determine the network metrics that should be preferred for selection of target 510 farms according to the approximation of epidemic sizes. In addition, the proposed framework 511 could be used as a decision tool for both local official veterinary services and the private sector 512 for evaluating animal movements and developing a more risk-oriented surveillance strategies. At 513 production system level, it allows for the creation of a hot-list with farms to which the 514 reinforcement of biosecurity would be key in the face of an outbreak. The model also provides 515 an estimation of the amount of personnel and material resources that would need to be allocated 516 to control the epidemic, which is key for preparedness for future events (Casal et al., 2019) . 517
Future studies are also needed to explore the contribution of movements to slaughter houses, 518 especially when pig are redirected to other slaughter houses (i.e., slaughter not able to slaughter 519 all animals) or send back to the farm of origin, this is very common in the US, however little is 520 known relevance in spreading disease back to the farm, however there is some early discussion 521 about it (Russell et al., 2020) . 522 523
Conclusion 524
The contact among farms of distinct biosecurity by pig movements identify a potential gap that 525 could result in the introduction and dissemination of FAD into commercial and highly connected 526 pig populations. One-third of all pig farms traded with the same partners in the course of two 527 years; consequently, the static networks did not offer reasonable information about the realized 528 temporal movement pathways. In this scenario, the use of static networks to target vulnerable or 529 high-risk farms by network metrics would likely overestimate the role of those farms in disease 530 transmission and limit the accuracy needed to optimize surveillance. Our proposed modeling 531 framework provides a parsimonious solution to this problem; it handles the temporal order of 532 movements, calculates the minimum number of farms needed to be targeted and approximates 533 the expected epidemic size in a worst-case scenario where each movement can effectively 534 transmit disease. The results from the application of this approach identified priority pig farms 535 that had remarkably limited biosecurity. This fact imposes important vulnerability to pathogen 536 introduction and spread; therefore, those farms could benefit from the implementation of The authors confirm that the ethical policies of the journal, as noted on the journal's author 560 guidelines page. Since this work did not involve animal sampling neither questioner data 561 collection there was no need for ethics permits. 562
Data Availability Statement 564
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the regional veterinary office. 565
Restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under confidentiality 566 agreements. 567 The number of unique contacts to and from a farm. When direction was taken into account, the ingoing and outgoing contacts were separated: the "out" degree is the number of contacts originating from a specific farm, and the "in" degree is the number of contacts directed toward a specific premise. 
Betweenness
The frequency at which a node is located on the shortest path between any two pairs of nodes in the network. breeder-farms, briefly is a combination of risks measurements form distance to farms to presence 771 of biosecurity and infrastructure of the farm. 772 
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